The Battle of Britain: Misperceptions that led to victory
LE3 .A278 2011
2011
Doerr, Paul
Acadia University
Bachelor of Arts
Honours
History
History & Classics
This thesis examines British preparations for the future of aerial warfare in the 1930s and the subsequent Battle of Britain in 1940. It argues that British planners in the 1930s prepared for the wrong war that was going to be fought in 1939 and early 1940. It shows that this mistake in planning was mainly due to poor information and an institutional bias toward offensive bombers. The thesis then looks at the defensive preparations made by Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding. It argues that though Britain had prepared for the wrong offensive battle that was fought in 1939 and early 1940, the preparations it made for a defensive battle gave the RAF a distinct advantage over the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain which would follow.
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https://scholar.acadiau.ca/islandora/object/theses:797